




EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE REFORM IN 













This article presents an evaluation of an ambitious health reform implemented in 
Colombia during the first half of the nineties. The reform attempted to radically 
change public provision of health services, by means of the transformation of 
subsidies to supply (direct transfers to hospitals) into a new scheme of subsidies to 
demand (transfers targeted at the poorest citizens). Although the percentage of the 
population having medical care insurance has notably increased, mostly among 
the poorest, problems of implementation have been numerous. It has not been 
possible to achieve the transformation of subsidies to supply into subsidies to 
demand. At the same time, competition has not made it possible to increase the 
efficiency of many public hospitals, which continue to operate with very low 
occupation rates, while receiving hefty money transfers. Subsidies increased 
demand for medical consultations, but have curbed demand for hospitalizations. 
Nonetheless, subsidies might have adversely affected female’s labor market 
participation and even household consumption. As a whole, evidence suggests 
that the health reform has been effective in rationalizing households’ demand for 
health, but not in rationalizing public supply, and neither in increasing the efficiency 
of service providers. 
 
Keywords: demand subsidies, targeted social services, instrumental variables.  
 
JEL Classification: I1, I11, I18, I38. 
 
                                                 
1 We thank David McKenzie and Rodrigo R. Soares for detailed comments on a previous version. 
Miguel Urquiola and participants of the 12
th Economia Panel Meeting provided helpful comments. 
Excellent research assistance from Lina Cardona is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are our own. 
* Associated professor Universidad de los Andes, agaviria@uniandes.edu.co.   
** Regional Director of Economic Studies, Banco de la República, cmedindu@banrep.gov.co. 
Opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Banco de la República (Colombian Central Bank) or of the members of its Board of Directors 
*** Researcher, Fedesarrollo, cmejia@fedesarrollo.org.  
 CEDE 
DOCUMENTO CEDE 2006-06 
ISSN 1657-7191 (Edición Electrónica)  











Este artículo presenta una evaluación de la reforma de salud implantada en 
Colombia durante la primera mitad de los años noventa. La reforma intentó 
cambiar la forma de la intervención pública en salud, mediante la transformación 
de los subsidios a la oferta (transferencias directas a los hospitales) a un nuevo 
esquema de subsidios a demanda (transferencias focalizadas hacia los más 
pobres). Aunque el porcentaje de la población con seguro medico ha crecido de 
manera notable, los problemas de implementación de la reforma han sido 
numerosos. La transformación de subsidios de oferta a demanda no ha podido 
completarse. Al mismo tiempo, la competencia no ha logrado incrementar la 
eficiencia de muchos hospitales públicos, que siguen operando con ocupaciones 
muy bajas pero recibiendo transferencias cuantiosas. De otro lado, los subsidios 
han aumentado la demanda por consultas pero han disminuido la demanda por 
hospitalizaciones. Los subsidios tampoco parecen haber tenido un efecto notable 
sobre el consumo de los hogares y pueden haber disminuido la participación 
laboral de las mujeres. En conjunto, la evidencia sugiere que el RS ha sido 
efectivo para racionalizar la demanda por salud de los hogares, pero no para 
racionalizar la oferta pública, ni para incrementar la eficiencia de los prestadores. 
 
 
Palabras clave: subsidios a la demanda, servicios sociales focalizados, variables 
instrumentales.   
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I. Introduction 
 
In 1993, Colombia implemented an ambitious health reform. Since its inception, the 
reform was considered to have been a great advance in terms of fairness and 
efficiency and was publicized as a paradigm to be imitated across the developing 
world. The reform attempted to transform health care provision in a radical way, 
especially for the poorest population. In essence, the reform attempted to 
transform public intervention in health care from an scheme of subsidies to supply 
(direct transfers to public hospitals) to a scheme of subsidies to demand (transfers 
targeted to poor citizens). To this effect, the reform put into practice a system of 
vouchers, under the assumption that, after a transition period, efficient public 
service providers would cover their costs through the sale of services, and that 
competition would eliminate the prevailing (and large) inefficiencies.  
 
The analysis of the impact of the health reform is not only important in itself; it also 
offers lessons that go beyond the peculiarity of any particular sector or country. 
Ultimately, an overview of the Colombian experience helps in understanding the 
difficulties inherent to any attempt of changing the nature of the provision of a 
social service (of moving from supply to demand), especially when public supply 
tends to be mostly determined by factors unrelated to conventional market forces, 
and when many institutions operate with soft-budget constraints. Furthermore, the 
Colombian experience also illustrates the complexities of evaluating an integral 
scheme of subsidies to demand.   
   4
This article is divided into two parts. The first describes some institutional aspects 
of the reform and emphasizes the difficulties found in the transformation of supply 
into demand. The second part evaluates the impact of subsidies to demand upon 
the use of services, health outcomes, as well as on household consumption and 
labor participation. Together, both parts offer an ambiguous balance of the reform. 
Despite the substantial increase in public expenditure on health care and the 
increase in the proportion of population with health insurance, many problems 
persist. On the one hand, the implantation of a scheme of subsidies to demand has 
not been accompanied by a dismantling of subsidies to supply, which has led to a 
doubling in expenditure and a multiplication of inefficiencies. On the other hand, 
the impact of subsidies upon health outcomes and household consumption are 
questionable, to say the least 
 
In particular, this article seeks to evaluate the impact of the Subsidized Regime 
(SR) on the three categories of outcomes: (i) on the state of health, subjectively 
measured through the self-report and objectively measured by the number of days 
in which the person ceased to perform regular activities; (ii) on the use of medical 
services (demand for preventive consultations, for medical consultations because 
of illness and for hospitalizations); and, lastly, (iii) on household consumption of 
goods and services different from health care and labor force participation.  
 
With the aim of overcoming the endogenous nature of enrollment into SR, a 
instrumental variables estimation strategy is used. Since just 50% of eligible 
individuals are enrolled in the program, and given that the enrollment depends on   5
social and political contacts within municipalities, both the share of the age of the 
household’s head living in current municipality, and his length of residence are 
used to instrument enrollment into the program. Following are the most important 
results of the evaluation. There seems to be a positive effect of enrollment upon 
the reported state of health (subjective measurement) and upon the use of both 
preventive and illness-related medical consultations. Likewise, enrollment seems to 
lessen the frequency of hospitalizations. Finally, the SR appears to have an 
adverse effect on consumption and on labor market participation. The remainder of 
this document is organized as follows: Section II presents a description of the 
reform and an analysis of the implementation problems. Section III briefly 
summarizes the relevant literature, outlines the empiric strategy and presents the 
results of the evaluation. Finally, Section IV draws some general conclusions. 
 
II. Colombia’s health reform: background, assumptions and results 
 
This section presents a description of: (i) the main institutional innovations 
introduced by the health reform; (ii) the assumptions that underlied the reforming 
efforts; and, (iii) the results that were finally achieved. As described ahead, the 
differences between the assumptions of the reformers and the realities of the 
reform were dramatic; which in turn explains the difference between the results 
foreseen and those achieved. In the end, the reform to Colombian health care can 
be construed as a warning against the difficulties, both institutional and political, in 
the implementation of a radical transformation in the way of providing a social 
service.    6
 
1. Institutional aspects before and after the reform 
 
Prior to the reform, the Colombian healthcare system was segmented into three 
independent subsystems: the public, the private, and the social security systems. 
The public system provided medical care to persons in the low and medium-low 
strata, who were not protected by any kind of medical insurance (about 70% of the 
total population in 1985). The private sector satisfied the demand of the high-
income population (15% of the total population), through direct charges to users or 
by means of private health insurance plans. The social security system included 
two types of institutions with different target populations. The Social Security 
Institute (Instituto de Seguridad Social) was targeted at formal workers belonging 
to the private sector and was financed by payroll taxes; and the Social Benefit 
Societies (Cajas de Previsión Social) were limited to public sector workers and 
were financed directly by the State. 
 
The system in place prior to the reform had three types of problems: (i) low levels 
of insurance coverage; (ii) inequities in the access to services, and low levels of 
solidarity; and (iii) high inefficiency in the public provision. These problems were 
not exclusive of the Colombian system. On the contrary, they were shared by the 
majority of healthcare systems in Latin America, which had been consolidated 
during the fifties and had favored, from their earliest inception, the higher income 
population. Gideon (1993) shows that, at the start of the nineties, nearly 45% of the 
urban population lacked medical insurance. Likewise, a large share of hospital   7
discharges and surgical procedures performed by the public system benefitted 
persons belonging to the top-income quintile. According to the World Bank (2003), 
such historical evidence suggests that, prior to the reform the most affluent 
persons were using public sector providers, not for primary care or consultations, 
like preventive medical visits, but for costly and high-complexity medical 
procedures. 
 
In 1993, Colombia put into practice one of the most ambitious social reforms ever 
undertaken in Latin America. Thus has been acknowledged by, among others, 
several multilateral organizations, which contributed not only huge amounts of 
resources but also technical orientation throughout the design and execution of the 
reform. The key principles of the reform included among others: (i) equity in access 
to health services, (ii) mandatory health insurance to everyone, (iii) comprehensive 
coverage, which includes the design of a benefit package that would be covered by 
the Mandatory Health Plan, POS, as well as a subsidized basket, POSS, which 
initially covered 50% of the POS, and (iv) free choice of insurer and health 
provider. 
 
First of all, the reform sought to solve the problems mentioned above by proposing: 
(i) to increase insurance coverage to 36 million people by 2000  (24 million 
targeted to the poorest), by increasing resources through National and regional 
contributions, as well as through national transfers, (ii) to increase solidarity by 
establishing cross subsidies among people able to contribute, and between these 
and those unable, and (iii) to increase efficiency through a radical change in the   8
way of participation by the State, which would shift from supply-side subsidies to 
demand-side subsidies of health services, and by increasing public hospitals 
efficiency through re-structuring programs. 
 
Given the existing problems, the reform intended that all individuals, regardless of 
their origin or economic means, would have access to a pre-established package 
of basic health services. The new healthcare system divided the operation into two 
different levels: the Contributive Regime (CR), which guaranteed the POS to its 
enrolees, was targeted at the population of means, and the Subsidized Regime 
(SR), which guaranteed the POSS to its enrolees, was designed for the poorest 
population.
2 During the transition period, before universal coverage was achieved, 
there would be also the uninsured population, accounted for mainly by the poor not 
covered by the SR.   
 
Population covered by the Contributive Regime 
Persons affiliated to the CR contribute with 12% of their earned income. The 
employer pays for two thirds of the contribution and the employee pays for the rest. 
The contribution is collected by the insurance carrier (EPS) that the contributor 
freely chooses. The EPS discounts from each contributor’s contribution the value 
of the premium stipulated by the regulation (UPC) for the worker and his/her 
dependants, and transfers the difference to an equalization fund known as the 
Fosyga in the Colombian legislation. When the said difference is negative, the 
                                                 
2 The resources required to cover the health services included in the POSS are mainly oriented to fund the less 
complex health services included in the POS, Currently, the POSS cover 56% of the costs of the POS.   9
Fosyga compensates the EPS with the corresponding value. One point of the 
contribution (i.e., the “solidarity point” in the Colombian legal jargon) is transferred 
to regional entities with the purpose of paying for the financing of SR’s 
beneficiaries (see Figure 1).  
 
Population covered by the Subsidized Regime 
Persons enrolled in the SR are selected through a test of their economic means 
(proxy-means test) known as the Sisben (System of Beneficiaries Selection). The 
score in the Sisben is used in determining six groups of social-economic levels, 
with level 1 grouping the poorest population. By legal stipulation, only those 
households belonging to levels 1 and 2 of the Sisben are eligible to receive the SR. 
In the SR there are insurance carriers (ARS), equivalent to the EPS of the CR. 
Enrolled members can freely select their insurance carrier, which receives a 
premium per each enrolled member (Subsidized UPC), corresponding to the 
estimated value of services in the package stipulated for the SR (see Figure 1). 
Each individual ARS establishes agreements with a limited number of public or 
private hospitals and health professionals, which provide health services to 
enrolees within the benefit package (the POSS) covered by the SR. If the health 
service demanded is not covered by the POSS, then the services are provided by 
public health care providers and the beneficiary would have to pay 5% of its cost if 
he or she was classified as Sisben 1, and 10% if classified as Sisben 2 
 
Resources of the SR come from different sources. The first of them, which was 
already mentioned, groups the shared payments put in by contributors to the CR   10
(i.e., solidarity contributions). The second source consists of resources 
corresponding to the transfers that the central government makes to regional 
entities. The third is made up of resources owned by each regional entity. 
According to Bitrán, Gideon and Muñoz (2004), in the year 2004, 64% of the cost 
of subsidized services was financed through transfers from the Nation; 24%, 
through shared contributions by persons enrolled in the contributive regime; and, 
the remaining 10% was financed through regional sources for health care and out-
of-pocket payments made by enrolees.  
 
Uninsured population 
A noteworthy fact is that the eligible but not covered population has a right to 
services provided by public hospitals (or private ones, by means of contracts with 
regional entities). These services are covered with the so-called supply-side 
subsidies. In summary, the Colombian health system is not only characterized by 
the existence of two different insurance systems according to enrolees’ ability to 
pay, but also by two schemes of confronted subsidies: demand-side subsidies for 
enrolees in the SR and supply-side subsidies for poor citizens not enrolled.  
 
In practice, the system’s administrators (municipalities in this case) seem to have 
considerable flexibility at the time of choosing who the beneficiaries of the SR will 
be. Given that municipalities are autonomous in the management of the targeting 
instrument (Sisben) and since the eligible population largely surpasses the number 
of beneficiaries, there is a wide margin for arbitrariness and political patronage. 
Concerning this, Ruiz et al (1999) point out that, for example, the enrollment in the   11
SR in a municipality on the Colombian Pacific Coast was done simply “by pointing 
at certain individuals on a whim. A lot of people enrolled were workers of the 
municipality, of the hospital, or of the insurer company itself”. Seemingly, this case 
repeats itself time and again all across the country. If belonging to a political 
patronage network or counting on political connections has a bearing on the 
probability of enrollment, having deep-rooted attachments to a municipality 
(understood, for instance, as the number of years of residence there) would be 
related with the said probability. This assumption plays a key role in the empirical 
strategy used for identifying the impact of the SR. 
 
2. Assumptions of the reform 
 
The health reform was approved based on a basic objective: the proposed 
changes would make it possible to achieve universal insurance coverage within a 
10-year term. This objective dominated the legislative discussion and ended up 
silencing any attempt to voice opposition or express skepticism. The achievement 
of that objective was based primarily on the projections for extending the coverage 
of the Contributive Regime, CR. According to initial calculations, the CR would 
guarantee healthcare coverage for 70% of the better-off tier of the population. 
Within that percentage, or target population of the CR, the percentage of enrolled 
members would increase from 40% to 90% of wage earners between the years 
1994 and 2000 , and would leap from 9% to 85% for independent workers. As is 
shown later on, these projections, based on too optimistic assumptions about 
economic performance and job generation, were not met.    12
 
However, the reformist calculations were not only optimistic about macroeconomic 
and labor market assumptions (and, therefore, in relation to growth in the number 
of individuals enrolled in the CR); they were also overly confident regarding the 
possibility of transforming supply-side subsidies into demand-side subsidies. 
According to the provisions established by lawmakers, after a period of transition, 
the SR would cover the totality of the eligible population (Sisben 1 and 2); public 
hospitals would be financed through sales revenues; and supply-side subisdies 
would be ostensibly reduced. Thus, public expenditure on health care would be 
primarily oriented to subsidizing demand by the poorest citizens and public 
hospitals would be transformed into efficient institutions thanks to competition. 
Entities not achieving competitiveness would simply disappear. In brief, it was 
assumed that public supply was elastic from a long-term viewpoint.  
 
Multilateral credit institutions backed the aforementioned assumptions. According 
to the World Bank (2004), for example, “in as much as the number of members 
enrolled in the EPS and ARS organizations continued to grow, the need for supply-
side subsidies would decline, given that public hospitals would be expected to 
finance half of their annual budget by selling their services to the members enrolled 
in the Contributive and Subsidized regimes”.  
 
Even if this reasoning is valid in theory, what happened in practice was an increase 
in the coverage of healthcare insurance, accompanied by a growth (not a 
reduction) in the number of public providers. In short, two assumptions presented   13
by the government and accepted by the political actors made it possible to pass 
the law: (i) feasibility of reaching universal coverage in health insurance, and (ii) 
feasibility of transforming health subsidies from the supply side to the demand side. 
As we will see, both of these proved to be fallacious. 
 
3. Results of the reform 
 
Let us first analyze the results of the first assumption of the reform, that of 
universal coverage of health insurance. Both coverage of the Contributive and the 
Subsidized regimes had a weaker-than-expected performance, as Figure 2 shows. 
Regarding the CR, the number of individuals actually covered was only 54% of that 
expected. Not only did growth rates projections turn out to be lower than the 
forecast, but something similar happened to the growth in formal employment. 
Thus, resources from the shared-contribution system were lower than expected, 
which negatively affected the financing of the subsidized regime and the expansion 
of coverage among the poorest population. Other sources had actually the largest 
gaps, namely those from the regions, which were expected to fund 30% of the SR, 
actually collected 90% less resources than expected; while national transfers, that 
were expected to fund 40% of the SR, collected 50% less resources than 
expected. The number of individuals actually covered by the SR was only 40% that 
expected in equivalent terms. On the whole, health insurance coverage increased 
from 28% in 1992 to 42% (instead of 100%) in 2000.  
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Despite such observed gap, some actors had anticipated that the goal to achieve 
universal coverage might have been too optimistic. What was less anticipated by 
them (or what was ignored by both political and academic actors), and constituted 
the greatest difference between the theory of the reform and its reality, had to do 
with the transformation of subsidies to supply into subsidies to demand. In the first 
place, the transformation of resources of supply into resources of demand was 
negatively affected by a predictable vicious circle: initially, supply resources had to 
be maintained in order to assist the poor, uninsured population; which, in turn, 
diminishes available resources for subsidies to demand, which hinders the 
enrollment of new members, and which prevents the reduction in resources of 
supply, thereby deducting more resources from demand, and so on. In other 
words, the increase in demand for healthcare resources occasioned by the greater 
insurance coverage is not immediate, which aggravates the transition and may 
lead to financially unsustainable situations for many public hospitals, thus leading 
them to exert political pressure for more direct transfers.  
 
But the problem of resource transformation goes beyond the transition. The 
political pressure exerted by inefficient public hospitals which were not able to 
attract resources through the sale of services, and therefore display a structural 
shortfall in their budgets, constituted the major bottleneck in accelerating the 
transition of subsidies to demand. Gaviria (2004) argues that public supply has 
proved to be fundamentally inelastic. It might have actually shown some elasticity, 
but not to market forces, as conceptually assumed by reformers, but to political 
ones: public hospitals have registered budget increases on the whole, while just a   15
few of the most inefficient have been shut down. According to available evidence, 
more than 10 years after the reform, there has been little advance towards 
rationalizing public supply and making it more efficient. 
 
The introduction of the SR has been accompanied by both growth in the number of 
public hospitals and lower levels of occupation—a predictable result in the face of 
soft-budget constraints. Currently, resources are used not only in maintaining 
underused public hospitals, but also into subsidizing demand by the poorest 
citizens, who prefer to use private hospitals. In other words, the cost of subsidies to 
demand has been absorbed, but subsidies to supply have never been dismantled, 
which has implied a doubling the cost (see Jack, 2000). To sum up, the lack of 
elasticity to market forces of public supply conspired against the most optimistic 
projections of reform. Once again, political pressures by public hospitals 
overpowered the intentions –evident in the rhetoric, diffuse in practice– that 
successive governments had of consolidating a new scheme of subsidies to 
demand.  
 
Figure 3 shows the budgetary consequences of the mentioned problem. Growth in 
the total budget of the healthcare sector increased substantially: the budget of 
public hospitals (initially meant -by reformists- to fund the SR) inflated instead of 
declining and a new expenditure item appeared: that of the SR, a good part of 
which comes from central budget and does not return by the sale of services 
supplied by public hospitals. The expenditure increase in public hospitals has not 
taken place as a result of either the opening of new hospitals in underserved areas   16
or a budget redistribution favoring efficient hospitals; rather, it occurred  because of 
expenditure boom in formerly established public hospital, thanks in part to the 
larger resources received from the central government, and to a huge increases in 
payroll and wages that took place by between 1995 and 1998 (World Bank, 2003). 
 
4. Some lessons from Colombia’s health reform 
 
The reform produced three results that had not been anticipated by those who 
pushed it through: (i) the duplicity in expenditure; (ii) the perpetuation of 
inefficiencies in public supply; and, (iii) the horizontal inequities generated by the 
lack of universal coverage of the SR. This situation constitutes a warning for those 
who continue to defend the movement towards schemes of demand subsidies with 
theoretical arguments that do not take political restrictions into consideration. If 
public supply is inelastic to market forces, the alternative is to reform political 
institutions that impede the working of market forces; or else, the alternative could 
be learning to live with the public supply. That does not necessarily mean stoically 
accepting the inefficiency of public providers; instead, it underscores the need of 
direct policies aimed at increasing the efficiency of existing suppliers, and exposes 
the naivety of believing that competition will take care of the problem. This fact is 
particularly true in a sector such as that of health care, in which, owing to political 
reasons public institutions operate with soft-budget constraints.  
 
On the other hand, lack of accurate information could partially explain this and 
other cases of myopic policy design. Governments promoting ambitious (somewhat   17
experimental) reforms in popular issues are usually well regarded by the 
electorate, regardless of the feasibility of the reform: good intentions are not always 
dwarfed by poor results. Thus, bold reformers have the incentives to push through 
risky  agendas, mostly when they can always find a multilateral institution to echo 
them conceptually and financially. 
 
III. Evaluation of a key component of the reform: the Subsidized Regime 
 
Given the complex structure of the Colombian health system shown in figure 1, a 
thorough evaluation would be beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, we 
focus on the impact evaluation of the Subsidized Regime, SR.  In spite of the   
aforementioned problems, the SR remains one of the most important health 
interventions in Latin America. Not only because of its cost (close to $1 billion 
dollars -1% of GDP- per year, or a quarter of all public resources invested in the 
health sector), but also because of its coverage (of over thirteen million people by 
2004). 
 
Since public hospitals’ budget has continued to grow after the reform, it is crucial to 
know whether insured individuals are better off than uninsured ones. In this 
section, we first overview previous work that evaluates the SR, then explain our 
model specification and empirical strategy, and finally present the results.  
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1. Bibliography overview and conceptual framework 
 
When the reform was approved, the need to get accurate impact evaluations was 
never considered. To that extent, most available work on the impact of the SR is 
based on strong (and doubtful) assumptions. Thus, the available evidence could 
hardly be used to forge a difficult consensus on the advantages and disadvantages 
of the reform. This article aims to overcome this problem.
3 
 
The vast majority of research conducted on the SR is descriptive in nature and has 
concentrated (i) in characterizing the formal institutional aspects, (ii) in measuring 
the incidence and targeting, and (iii) in evaluating the differences between the 
private and public ARS (O’Meara et al. 2003, Vélez and Foster 2000, Londoño et 
al. 2001, among others). Ayala and Henao (2001) argue that, in spite of the 
advances in insurance coverage, the system displays problems of resource 
allocation and efficiency: it does not reach the poorest individuals and a large 
group of independent workers (who are not poor enough to be eligible for the SR 
but who earn less than enough to contribute to the CR) is not covered either.  
 
                                                 
3 There exists an extensive international literature on the impact of health insurance. Levy and 
Meltzer (2001) divide this literature into three categories: (i) observational studies, (ii) quasi-
experimental studies, and (iii) randomized experiments (or social experiments). This article belongs 
to the second category. On this respect, it is worthwhile to cite the works of Currie and Gruber 
(1996 and 1997) and Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004); both pairs of authors analyze the impact of 
Medicaid between 1979 and 1992. The first authors find that increases in health insurance 
coverage improve health indicators for children (rate of mortality at birth, rate of infant mortality, 
child’s weight at birth, preventive medical visits during the last month of pregnancy, and 
hospitalization during the past year, among others). The second pair of authors is less optimistic; 
they point out that Medicaid expansions had a more modest impact. In general, the impact of health 
insurance on health outcomes remains an open question in the literature.   19
Along the same lines, Bitrán et al. (2004), Escobar and Panopoulou (2003), BDO y 
CCRP (2000), DNP (2000, 2001, 2003, 2003a), and others, find that there still 
exists a large part of the poorest population without formal insurance. These 
studies reiterate that the system has somewhat large errors of both inclusion (non-
poor households receiving subsidy) and exclusion (poor households not receiving 
subsidy). 
 
Bitrán et al. (2004) also show that households enrolled in the SR spend more in 
health care (as a proportion of total household spending) than those enrolled in the 
CR and that, for obvious reasons, they are more vulnerable to falling below poverty 
line as a result of and adverse health-related shock. In a first attempt to evaluate 
the impact of the SR, Panopoulus and Vélez (2001) identify, initially, the factors 
that determine enrollment and, later, study the effect of enrollment on both the use 
of medical services and the spending in health services. In relation to the first 
outcome, they conclude that enrollment depends both on factors related with 
demand (individual) and those related with supply (municipality)
4, although they 
vary in importance depending on whether the individual resides in a rural or urban 
zone. In relation to the second issue, they find that beneficiaries of the SR are 
more likely to visit a doctor and less likely to be admitted to a hospital. 
Nevertheless, they spend less in medical services than those not enrolled.   
Contrary to what Panopoulus and Vélez found, Trujillo et al. (2004) show that an 
enrollment to the SR does increase the use of medical services (preventive care, 
ambulatory visits, and inpatient care).  
                                                 
4 The medical expenditures considered were hospitalization, medical visits and medications.   20
 
Both articles use the Colombian 1997 LSMS survey and both propose similar 
strategies to account for the endogeneity of enrollment: using spatial variation in 
key characteristics and arguing that they are independent of the health variables 
analyzed. Panopoulus and Vélez (2001) use as instruments the popularity of the 
mayor of the municipality of residence and the hospitalization rate of the state. On 
the other hand, Trujillo et al. (2004) use as instruments a set of dummy variables 
indicating whether the municipality has a health center, whether it is covered by a 
major national assistance agency (Red de Solidaridad Social), as well as an index 




As will be shown later, spatial variables are likely to be related to health outcomes: 
not controlling for municipality fixed effects could severely bias impact estimates of 
the SR. Furthermore, the Propensity Score Matching (PPS) estimates used by both 
papers are troublesome. For example Trujillo et al. (2004)’ estimates have some 
obvious problems: (i) the propensity scores do include variables that can be 
classified as outputs (health status, head’s employment status and health 
expenditures) and (ii) it’s not clear whether matched individual are drawn from the 
comparison group with or without replacement.   
 
Figure 4 summarizes the major lines of analysis of this article. In first place, it 
studies the effect of the SR on the use of medical services. Hypothetically, the 
                                                 
5 There are 34 states and 1100 municipalities in Colombia.   21
lower cost faced by enrolled individuals increases service use;  especially for the 
poorest--income is usually the first factor determining demand for medical services 
(see Andersen, 1995). In second place, the SR should positively affect 
consumption, not only because it significantly reduces the price of a relevant 
package of medical services, but also because it lessens the financial impact that 
may emerge in case of a medical event of significance.  
 
For effects of this study, the impact of the SR is analyzed on the basis of the four 
variables underlined in Table 4. In general, the hypotheses analyzed are the 
following. The SR has a positive effect on health status, both if measured in a 
subjective manner (self-report) and if measured in an objective manner (days that 
the individual ceased performing regular activities because of illness).
6 The SR has 
a positive effect on the use of preventive visits and illness-related visits. The effect 
on the demand for inpatient care is ambiguous. On the one hand, the use of 
preventive and ambulatory services averts the later use of curative services (Tono, 
2000); on the other hand, the lower cost of inpatient care might increase its use. 
The SR has a positive effect on the consumption of goods different from health 
services, as it frees disposable income via price, thereby increasing consumption 
possibilities.
7 Finally, the SR could have a negative impact on labor market 
participation. 
 
                                                 
6 Although the ideal objective measure of the state of health of any person is a medical report, this 
information is not available in the data base used. 
7 We include in consumption all expenditures made by the household, except durable goods, health 
and education.   22
2. Empirical strategy and data base  
 
The evaluation of the impact of the SR has to start by solving the problem of the 
endogenous nature of enrollment. Since the selection of beneficiaries is not 
randomized, the problem of selection in the non-observables is the first obstacle 
that must be confronted. We now proceed to illustrate how individuals are selected 
into the SR, and then present the empirical strategy used to get the impact 
estimates. 
 
Procedure to enroll individuals into the Subsidized Regime 
According to the Colombian health regulations, municipal authorities are 
responsible of enrolling individuals into the SR but have no discretion to do so, only  
a set of procedures to follow.
8 Figure 5 presents the steps municipal authorities 
must follow to enroll individuals into the SR. First, individuals are classified as 
either “especial” or not. If an individual is classified as “especial”, he (and his family 
group) is automatically included in a list of potential beneficiaries; otherwise, the 
proxy means test (Sisben) is applied to his family group: each member is classified 
according to their Sisben score in one out of six levels. Among the subset of 
people in Sisben levels 1 or 2, other groups of “especial” individuals must also be 
included automatically into the list of potential beneficiaries: first pregnant women, 
then children under five, and so on. Once all special groups have been included, 
and if available resources permit to enroll additional people, the list of potential 
beneficiaries must be complemented with those belonging to Sisben levels 1 or 2. 
                                                 
8 See Accords 77 of November/1997, and 244 of January/2003.   23
Municipalities are responsible of publicly displaying the complete list of potential 
beneficiaries and of asking them to freely select their preferred insurance carrier, 
ARS. Individuals not selecting an ARS on time are dropped from the list and 
replaced by other individuals not initially included and belonging to Sisben levels 1 
or 2. Once individuals selected their preferred ARS, they become officially enrolled 
in the SR. 
 
Figure 5 uses bold-face to designate local institutions in charge of key steps in the 
selection process.
9 If there were any sort of corruption (or unduly favoritism) in any 
of these institutions, ineligible individuals might have the possibility to be included 
in the list of potential beneficiaries, thus getting access to the SR.  
 
Empirical Methodology 
Several types of biases can arise if we do not consider the endogeneity of 
enrollment to the SR. For instance, if enrollment depends on the extent of social 
connections, then individuals belonging to the medium stratum who are in good 
health would have a high probability of becoming beneficiaries, and that, in turn, 
could bias the estimation of the impact of the SR. With the aim of solving this 
problem, this article uses a instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy.
10  
 
                                                 
9 ICBF: Colombian Institute of Family Welfare, in charge of policy for children (National entity with 
local branches); RSS: Social Solidarity Network, in charge of policy for population displaced by 
violence (National entity with local branches). 
10 An IV strategy is surely the most adequate for the problem at hand. The traditional non-
parametric methods (Propensity Score Matching) do not correct the problem of selection in the non-
observable. Other methods (differences in differences) cannot be applied given that no base line is 
available.    24
As usual, the idea is to find a variable that directly affects enrollment, but that does 
not directly affect the outcome under analysis. In notational terms, let Zit be the 
instrumental variable affecting participation (Dit), but that does not affect the 
outcome (Yit).
11 Under the assumption that all individuals exhibit homogeneous 
responses to the SR, a two-stage estimation procedure is followed. In the first 
stage, Zit and Xit are used in predicting Dit:  
  ( ) it it it it V Z X f D + = , , (1) 
where Dit=1 if individual i is enrolled in the SR at time t and Dit=0 otherwise. In the 
second stage, the predicted value  it D ˆ  of Dit is plugged into the impact equation: 
  ( ) it it t i t it D X f Y ε α + + = ˆ . (2) 
The parameter α  can be interpreted, under certain assumptions, as the mean 
impact of the SR. 
12 
 
We propose, as instrument for enrollment in the SR, the fraction of life that the 
head of household reports having resided in the municipality where he/she resided 
at the moment when the survey was conducted. In other words, we assumed that, 
conditional to certain observable characteristics, this variable has an incidence on 
the person’s enrollment in the SR, but has no direct incidence on the outcome 
                                                 
11 Beyond standard assumptions, IV only requires that conditional in X, the decision to participate is 
a non-trivial function (non constant) of Z, and the existence of g(Z) such that: E(g(Zit) εit)=0, and g(Z) 
not collinear with f(X) (see Heckman and Robb (1985), and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999)). 
The annex presents a listing of all variables (X, Y, Z) with the corresponding statistic descriptions. 
12 This follows if either we assume that treatment is homogeneous for all the population, or that it is 
heterogeneous, but simultaneously it holds that E(U1-U0|X;D=1)=0, in which cases the average 
treatment effect, ATE, equals the average treatment on the treated, ATT (see, for example, 
Heckman and Robb (1985), and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999)).   25
variables studied: health status, use of medical services,  household consumption 
and labor force participation. 
 
In justifying this decision, it is pertinent to make two precisions. First, the SR is 
managed directly by the Colombian municipalities, which are in charge of selecting 
the beneficiaries and paying the premiums to the intermediary companies (ARS). 
Second, given the existing horizontal inequities, of close to 50%, municipalities 
have ample autonomy to decide who gets the subsidy and who doesn’t, even if 
they do choose to allocate all available resources to the eligible population (Sisben 
1 and 2). This is more so when enrollment information is not usually updated and 
overseeing is intermittent at best.
13 
 
Anecdotic and empirical evidence suggests that enrollment to the SR seems to be 
related with political connections and to the density of social networks, just like 
happens with the individual’s (or its family’s) capacity to wangle. This problem 
becomes evident once we note that by 2000, seven years after the reform had 
been approved, 54% of the beneficiaries claimed that they did not know their 
                                                 
13 According to BDO and CCRP (2000), only 62% of the information available in the databases of a 
sample of 93 municipalities was supported by the corresponding filled out forms, the rest had been 
destroyed, were unreadable, lost, etc. When a follow up survey was applied to families that had a 
Sisben form available, 48% of them had information consistent with the follow up survey, only 8% 
required to be classified in a lower level, and 44% in a higher level, showing a clear bias toward 
benefiting the ineligible. Finally, when individuals were asked for the reasons why they were not 
beneficiaries of the SR, 25% said that they did not know how to apply, 9% that there were too many 
official procedures, 40% said they already had their Sisben score but the municipality had not 
proceed to enroll them, and 10% that they lack economic resources. On the other hand, the same 
source reports that, in 2000, only 61% of individuals reported by ARS as their beneficiaries were in 
Sisben levels 1 or 2, 9% were in Sisben 3 and 30% did not have any Sisben score since they were 
not subject to the proxy means test.   26
rights.
14 Actually, 9% of beneficiaries of the SR selected their ARS following the 
recommendations of a friend, relative, politician or local leader, while 36% said that 
their ARS was assigned by their municipality.
15 Thus, local authorities appear to 
have enough leeway to point at specific insurers at the moment to enroll 
beneficiaries, from which they might illicitly benefit: especially when less than 7% of 
beneficiaries actually participated in the election of local committees of citizenship 
participation and vigilance.
16 On the other hand, in large municipalities and in cities 
where connections are less important, the formalities required to obtain enrollment 
demand prudential time. Furthermore, several government documents that have 
carefully examined the selection process into the SR have mentioned the existence 
of political biases.
17 Of course, political patronage can not be considered as the 
only way to get access to the SR, but it is definitely an important one. 
 
In sum, the crucial assumption is that the extent of social and political connections 
is related with the fraction of life that the head of household has been living in the 
municipality of residence. In other words, residence can measured how deep-
                                                 
14 See BDO and CCRP (2000). 
15 See BDO and CCRP (2000). 
16 See BDO and CCRP (2000). In addition, National Department of Planning, DNP (2003) reports 
that individuals do not participate in the committees because (i) they are afraid to confront the 
ineligible beneficiaries, (ii) they do not have time, or (iii) they think that the committees serve no 
purpose whatsoever. On the other hand, people distrust the committees: they report that some 
members use them either for political purposes or for personal gain.  
17 See, for example, DNP (2003), page 125. Also DNP (2001), page 44. The latter document, for 
example, reiterate the limits of community participation due to local political misconduct. Finally, 
DNP (2000) presents the statements of State governors, mayors, and local attorneys, all of whom 
denounce the lack of local control and political misconduct of the system administrators and Sisben 
surveyors.    27




Data used  
Data used come from the Colombian 2003 LSMS survey, which contains 
information on 22,949 households and 85,150 individuals and is representative of 
the country as a whole. This survey contains a detailed module on health, which 
has information at the individual level concerning. (i)  insurance status, (ii) health 
status and (iii) use of medical services (preventive visits, illnes-related ambulatory 
visits, use of inpatient care, and out-of-pocket payments for services). Also 
reported is individual information on education, labor market conditions, as well as 
information at the household level on consumption, income and dwelling 
characteristics.   
 
In the evaluation’s jargon, the individual who reported being enrolled in the SR is 
considered treated, and the individual who reported otherwise, non-treated. All 
individuals belonging to either the CR or to special health regimes were dropped 
from the sample. This selection is made with the purpose of avoiding negatively 
biasing the impact estimates. In addition, four categories of outcome variables (Yit 
variable en Eq. 2, see Table 1) were considered: health status, use of medical 
services, consumption and labor market participation. 
 
                                                 
18 Some specifications (not shown) use the number of years spent in the municipality of current 
residence instead of the fraction of life. In this case, results were similar to those shown in the 
following section.   28
The first category includes a subjective measurement: a binary variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the person considers his/her state of health as very good or 
good,  and the value of 0, otherwise; and an objective measurement: the number of 
days that the individual stopped performing regular activities because of the latest 
health problem experienced (an illness not requiring hospital admission). In the 
category of use of medical services, three variables are considered: use of 
preventive visits and use of illness-related visits during the 30 days prior to the 
survey, and admission to hospital during the last twelve months–these three binary  
variables take on the value of 1 if the event occurs, and of 0 otherwise. In the third 
category of outcome variables, the per capita consumption in 2003 pesos is 
analyzed (without including healthcare spending). Finally, in the fourth category, 
labor market participation is analyzed by means of a variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the person is employed or unemployed, and of 0 if inactive.
19 
 
Table 1 also shows the exogenous variables (the Xit vector of Eq. 1 and 2) used in 
the evaluation.
20 These variables are classified in three types: individual, 
household and census track variables. Additionally, some specifications include 
municipalities fixed effects. Finally, the instrumental variable, Zit  in Eq. 2, 
corresponds to the fraction of life that the head of household reports having lived in 
the municipality where he/she resided at the time of the survey. 
 
                                                 
19 Only for people 12 or older. 
20 The use of medical services is commonly considered to be a function of the person’s state of 
health. This model, however, takes the state of health as an endogenous variable, and it does not 
study the relationship between that variable and the use of medical services.   29
As mentioned earlier, some authors, Bitrán et al. (2004), Panopoulus and Vélez 
(2001) and Trujillo et al. (2004), have indicated that targeting problems are 
widespread in the SR: there are non-poor persons who receive the subsidy while 
there are poor persons who do not get it. Map 1 illustrates the spatial distribution of 
households living in Bogotá (Colombia’s capital city) and interviewed as part of the 
2003 LSMS survey. Each dot represents a block where at least one household was 
interviewed. There are seven tones in the map, each representing a 
socioeconomic strata. The zoomed area shows a sector of the city inhabited by 
lower and lower-middle class households (strata 2 an 3). Empty squares denote 
blocks where no SR beneficiaries were found. Crisscrossed squares denotes 
blocks where there is at least an insured household and uninsured one. As shown, 
there are many blocks where such a situation is found. Given the high levels of 
spatial segregation in Colombian cities in general and in Bogotá in particular, it 
should be clear from the map that horizontal inequalities are rather common 




In an attempt to ratify the conclusions of the mentioned authors, the SISBEN score 
was constructed (with data from the 2003 LSMS survey) for each one of the 
households, following the questions and original weightings of the survey.  Table 2 
shows the distribution of beneficiaries according to SISBEN level. The results 
                                                 
21 Socioeconomic strata are a spatial targeting mechanism used in Colombia to assign public 
services subsidies. There are six socioeconomic strata, one being the poorest. The Sisben survey 
is applied always to all people living in strata one and two, and in some municipalities, to people in 
strata 3 and over.   30
suggest the existence of problems of exclusion (poor households not receiving 
subsidy) and of inclusion (non-poor households receiving subsidy): in levels 1 and 
2 of the SISBEN, more than half the population is not enrolled in the SR, whereas 
in levels 3 and 4, a percentage higher than 20% reports being enrolled. Table 3 
repeats the same exercise for income quintiles. Results are the same as in the 
former case. Taken together, the results suggest that targeting is far from perfect.
22  
 
The previous results bring to the fore one of the main problems of the reform. The 
movement from a scheme of subsidies to supply towards a scheme of subsidies to 
demand was, to a large extent, based on the need of improving targeting. But the 
results have been discouraging, casting serious doubts on the premise to the effect 
that “whatever goes to demand is better targeted”. In all probability, political 
patronage and outright favoritism have thwarted the initial intentions of the 
reformers.  
 
Before moving on to the evaluation, it may be pertinent to study the mean 
differences among enrolled and non-enrolled individuals for each of the outcome 
variables. This exercise is performed not only for the whole sample (Table 4) but 
also for the sub-sample of individuals classified in the 1 and 2 SISBEN levels 
(Table 5). In the first exercise, the non-enrolled individuals report a better health 
status, fewer days of illness-related inactivity, better household conditions, and a 
higher labor market participation. Separately, enrolled individuals report greater 
                                                 
22 The results may exaggerate the importance of targeting manipulation since we observe the SISBEN levels 
at the moment of the survey rather than at the time of affiliation.    31
use of medical services (preventive consultation, consultation on illness, and 
hospitalization) and greater per capita consumption. When circumscribing the 
analysis for individuals in the 1 and 2 SISBEN levels, almost all results hold up.  
 
3. Results of the evaluation  
 
This section presents the results of the evaluation. The analysis is first performed 
for the total sample and later for the sub-sample of individuals belonging to 
SISBEN levels 1 and 2.   
 
For each variable, four estimations are presented: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
with and without municipality fixed effects, and Instrumental variables (IV)  with and 
without municipality fixed effects.
23 All specifications correct for the possible 
heteroscedasticity in errors. Besides, all estimations were repeated with a larger 
group of control variables that includes census tract characteristics. Because the 
evaluation results are quite sensitive to instrument choice, two robustness 
exercises were carried out. The first exercise used a slightly different instrument: 
instead of the fraction of life that the head of household has resided in the 
municipality where he/she currently lives, the number of years that the head of 
household has lived in the same municipality was used. Results do not change. 
The second exercise used a sample restriction: the whole exercise was repeated 
for the city of Bogotá, the main city of the country, where health care availability is 
                                                 
23 In IV specifications the R-square is not reported. Reported instead are the coefficient and the 
significance of the instrumental variable in the first stage of the estimation.   32
greater than in other regions. Once again, the main results do not change 
substantially.  
 
Table 6 shows the estimated impact of the SR upon state of health: reported health 
status (subjective measurement) and number of days that the individual stopped 
performing regular activities (objective measurement). For the first variable, the 
impact of the SR goes from being negative in the OLS estimation to being positive 
in the IV estimation. The estimated coefficient is 15 percentage points if 
municipalities fixed effects are included, and to 23 points if they are not. In the case 
of the number of days that the individual stopped performing regular activities, the 
SR does not seem to have any effect. The same result is obtained for both the 
OLS estimations and the IV estimations.  
 
Regarding the effect of the SR on the use of medical services, Table 7 shows 
evidence in favor of a positive and substantial impact on both the attendance to 
preventive medical consultations and the attendance to medical consultations on 
illness. In the case of preventive consultations, the estimated effect becomes lower 
when municipalities fixed effects are included (39 vs. 25 percentage points), 
whereas in the case of consultations on illness, the contrary occurs (62 vs. 66 
percentage points). Both results suggest that the SR facilitates access to medical 
care, either because of lower cost or because of greater availability of services. For 
hospitalization, the effect is the opposite: enrollment in the SR decreases the 
probability of having been hospitalized by approximately 11 percentage points in 
the IV estimation.    33
 
As speculation, it could be argued that by encouraging attendance to preventive 
medical consultations, the SR diminishes the need of hospitalizations. But perhaps 
the explanation is more straightforward and the results will simply show that non-
covered persons, because of the absence of insurance itself, tend to request 
medical services via emergency rooms, which  implies, in many cases, a 
preventive hospitalization. In summary, even if the SR does not avoid 
hospitalizations through the better health of enrollees, does in fact seem to avoid 
them by means of a more efficient use of medical resources. 
 
The latter result was not foreseen by reformers, who forecasted an increase in the 
demand for hospitalization services as a consequence of the extension of the 
insurance to the poorest population. The evidence suggests that the SR 
rationalized demand for hospital services, although it raised the number of 
consultations, which is consistent with the increase in transfers to public hospitals 
that occurred after the reform. As was stated earlier, these transfers did not go into 
financing an improved functioning but to compensate for the deficit generated by 
surplus capacity.  
 
Table 8 shows the effect of the SR on consumption.  Although OLS estimates 
indicate a negative effect of the SR on consumption, IV estimates show no effect. 
This result suggests that savings on medical services prompted by enrollment in 
the SR is not substantial and does not seem to be reflected in greater 
consumption. Or alternatively, that the effect of the SR may be offset by behavioral   34
responses: diminished labor force participation, for example. All in all, the 
subjective well-being indicators show that in the better case, the SR has a nil 
effect. 
 
The effect of the SR on consumption may suggest an adverse effect on labor 
participation, as it is actually shown in Table 9. Even though the OLS estimates (for 
males and females combined, only for males and only for females) are not 
significant, the IV estimates suggest that the SR reduces participation by as much 
as 24 percentage points. The effects differ substantially according to gender. 
Whereas female participation is reduced by as much as 34 points, male 
participation remains unchanged. All in all, the SR might indeed relax the need of 
looking for a job in order to afford getting health insurance or demanding health 
services as uninsured individuals. 
 
  It is worth to point out that if a household member gets a formal job and is 
consequently enrolled in the CR, then all family members will also be enrolled. 
Thus, if, say, a woman head of household gets access to a job in the formal sector,  
all household members will be excluded from the SR, and would have apply again 
had the woman in question lost her job. Thus, access to the SR could discourage 
individuals from taking risky (in terms of long run stability) experiences in the formal 
sector. To that extent, the SR ends up working as an additional labor market 
rigidity for the movement of individuals from the informal to the formal sector.  
   35
We re-run all the models restricting the sample to the SISBEN 1 and 2 population, 
theoretically the target population of the program. For the self-reported health 
status, the effect is negative and small in the OLS estimation, and positive and 
close to 40 percentage points in the IV estimation, much larger than for the whole 
sample (Table 8). As it happened in the earlier case, there does not seem to be a 
discernible effect upon the number of days that the person ceased performing 
regular activities because of illness. For this estimation, the sample is quite small, 
1,700 observations, which may explain the difficulty in finding significant effects.  
 
As for the impact of the SR on the use of preventive consultations (consultations 
on illness), an important difference appears from the earlier exercise, which 
analyzes the total sample.  Table 10 shows that the effect is larger in this case, 
especially when municipality fixed effects are included.  There may be two 
explanations for the larger effect of the SR on the poorest population (SISBEN 1 
and 2). On the one hand, access to SR would relax their budget and liquidity 
constraints, which are likely to be much more severe for this group than for the 
whole sample. On the other hand, there might be some sort of larger adverse 
selection in this group. 
   
The effect of SR on consultations on illness are in this case nil, thus suggesting 
that for this group barriers to access are not important enough to prevent them 
from consulting a doctor when an illness comes up. Finally, results do not change 
when studying the effect of the SR on hospitalization: the effect continues to be 
negative and close to 10 percentage points, and the explanation remains the   36
same: greater prevention and higher efficiency in the use of services prevents 
ending up in hospitalization.  
 
Table 12 shows the estimation of the impact of the SR on the per capita 
consumption in the restricted sample.  Results are now negative for both OLS and 
IV estimates, with and without controlling for municipalities: monthly consumption is 
approximately COP$75,000 (US$ 30) lower. Finally, Table 13 presents the effects 
upon labor market participation. Results are similar to those found for the whole 
sample, nonetheless, they are larger in magnitude for females, which in this case 
would be 41 points less likely to participate in the labor market when enrolled. 
Again, results on consumption and labor market participation are consistent and 
stronger than for the whole sample. Needless to say, reformers did not 
contemplate this type of effect either. 
 
In summary, the SR seems to have a positive impact on perceived health status, 
but not so on the number of days of temporary disability.  At the same time, 
evidence is consistent with a rationalization in the use of medical services: more 
consultations and fewer hospitalizations.  Finally, SR has a negative impact on 
consumption and labor market participation. 
 
It is important to note that an exhaustive evaluation of the SR would have to 
consider the existence of general equilibrium effects.  Given that the subsidized 
regime oriented poor individuals’ demand towards private hospitals (i.e. the ARS 
contracts an important share of services with hospitals of a private nature), public   37
hospitals have greater capacity to service the non-insured, which could improve 
the quantity and quality of the service. This type of effects is not considered in the 
previous analysis.  
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
This article presents an evaluation of an ambitious health reform implemented in 
Colombia during the first half of the nineties. Among other things, the reform 
attempted to change the form of public intervention in health, through the 
transformation of subsidies to supply (direct transfers to hospitals) to a new 
scheme of subsidies to demand (transfers targeted to the poorest population). 
Likewise, the reform put into practice a complex system of financing based, in part, 
on shared contributions by formal workers.  
 
At first glance, the results of the reform have been positive. The percentage of the 
population with a medical insurance, even though well below what the reform 
predicted, has grown notably, especially among the poorest. But problems persist. 
It has not been possible to complete the transformation of subsidies to supply from 
those to demand. In practice, both schemes subsist and there has been a 
duplication of expenditure: demand started being subsidized, but subsidizing 
supply has been continued. At the same time, competition has not raised the 
efficiency of many public hospitals, which continue to operate with very low 
occupancy rates, but receiving hefty transfers.    38
To sum up, the adoption of subsidies to demand has not achieved transforming the 
historic inefficiencies of a sector that has demonstrated great inertia of costs and 
an almost absolute inelasticity of supply. 
 
From another angle, the analysis suggests that the targeting of subsidies to 
demand has not been positive either, and that municipalities seem to be incurring 
in practices of political patronage (or favoritisms of other types) at the time of 
assigning subsidies. Ultimately, the Colombian experience calls attention to the 
fact that granting subsidies to demand, especially when horizontal inequities exist, 
may result in political opportunism. If the old subsidies to supply created, in several 
Latin American countries, labor union strongholds dedicated to capture rents, 
subsidies to demand have generated networks of political patronage dedicated to 
select the beneficiaries with a political interest.  
 
As a final point, subsidies to health care have a negative effect on households’ 
consumption and on female’s labor force participation. These results are mutually 
consistent, casting serious doubts upon the effect of the subsidized regime on 
overall wellbeing. All in all, the results imply that the program could have created 
an involuntary hurdle for individuals seeking to pass from informal to formal 
employment. As a whole, evidence suggests that the SR has been effective in 
rationalizing households’ demand for health care, but not in rationalizing public 
supply or increasing the efficiency of service providers.   39
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Figure 2. Projected versus Actual Number of Individuals Enrolled 
(i) Contributive Regime
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Figure 5. Process of beneficiaries selection into the SR 
 
Abandoned children → ICBF
Indigent population → Municipality
Displaced population → RSS
Indigenous population → Law 691/2001
Ex member of armed group → Ministry of Justice
Head women working for HCB/ICBF → ICBF
Abandonded old population → Municipality
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Table 1. Variables used in the analysis 
Result variables (Y)  Exogenous variables (X) 
State of Health  Individuals 
Good health and days note able to 
perform normal activities. 
Age, gender, marital status, ethnic minority and 
years of formal education. 
Use of medical services  Home 
Preventive consultation, 
consultation on illness and 
hospitalization during the past 
year. 
Ascending indices for the type of housing, 
materials that walls are made of, floors, and 
quality of waste disposal system and water 
source.  Dichotomizing variable for the 
aqueduct service, sewage system and garbage 
collection system.  
Well-being Household 
Per capita consumption, good 
economic conditions in the 
household and whether their living 
standards have improved.   
Age of household head, woman head of 
household, years of education of household 
head, head unemployed, proportion of children 
under 7 years of age, per capita income, 
dichotomizing variable by displacement, rural 
residence and region.   
Labor market participation   
Person is employed or seeking for 
a job (active)   
 
 
Table 2. Targeting of the SR according to the SISBEN level 




1 55.6%  44.4%  100% 
2 53.3%  46.7%  100% 
3 61.4%  38.6%  100% 
4 74.2%  25.8%  100% 
5 87.7%  12.3%  100% 
6 96.1%  3.9%  100% 
 
 
Table 3. Targeting of the SR according to income quintiles 




1 56.8%  43.2%  100% 
2 58.4%  41.6%  100% 
3 67.5%  32.5%  100% 
4 75.6%  24.4%  100% 
5 85.2%  14.8%  100%   49
 
Table 4. Mean differences in result variables: enrolled and not enrolled in the 
SR  (whole sample) 






Health            
Good health  70.8%  62.5%  Yes  45836 
Days not able to perform regular 
activities 5.84  6.00  No  4661 
Use of medical services            
Preventive consultation  35.9%  52.0%  Yes  45836 
Consultation on illness    59.1%  77.9%  Yes  4661 
Hospitalization 5.3%  6.8%  Yes  45836 
Well-being           
Per capita consumption ($) 
    
114,965        82,653   Yes  45836 
Conditions in the home are good  37.5%  33.4%  Yes  45836 
Living standards have improved lately 31.9% 30.7%  Yes  45836 
Labor Participation  74.9% 70.2%  Yes  45836 
*Significant at 99%. 
 
 
Table 5. Mean differences in result variables between the enrolled and the 
not enrolled (SISBEN 1 and 2) 







Health            
Good health  65.0% 59.4%  Yes  18393 
Days not able to perform regular 
activities  6.84 6.28  No  1799 
Use of medical services            
Preventive consultation   24.5% 46.0%  Yes  18393 
Consultation on illness    59.9% 76.5%  Yes  1799 
Hospitalization 5.3%  6.6%  Yes  18393 
Well-being           
Per capita consumption ($) 
     
69,311       61,357  Yes  18393 
Conditions in the home are good  27.4% 28.2%  Yes  18393 
Living standards have improved lately  29.8% 28.0%  Yes  18393 
Labor Participation  76.4% 68.6% Yes  18393 
*Significant at 99%. 
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Table 6. Effect of the SR on health status (whole sample) 
Dependent variables: good health and number of days that the individual stopped performing regular activities 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
   Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Good Health                    
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0300 -0.0314 0.2491 0.1472 -0.0219 -0.0237 0.2257 0.1537 
Standard  error  0.0062 0.0063 0.0652 0.0694 0.0063 0.0064 0.0676 0.0689 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects    No Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations  45031 45031 45031 45031 44280 44280 44280 44280 
R-squared  0.1760 0.2016 0.1756 0.2008 0.1975 0.2189 0.1974 0.2186 
Days not able to perform 
regular activities                 
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.1399 -0.4002 0.0792 0.6482 -0.6122 -0.8345 4.6608 3.6610 
Standard  error  0.5146 0.5152 6.8167 6.9464 0.5271 0.5324 6.9029 6.9444 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.0933  0.0971       0.0928  0.0991 
Standard error       0.0266  0.0267       0.0258  0.0251 
Municipalities  fixed  effects  No Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations  4602 4602 4602 4602 4543 4543 4543 4543 
R-squared  0.0363 0.0745 0.0363 0.0743 0.0714 0.1018 0.0711 0.1012 
 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
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Table 7. Effect of SR on the use of medical services (whole sample) 
Dependent variables:  Preventive consultation, consultations on illness and hospitalization. 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS  IV OLS IV 
   Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Preventive consultation                    
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.1918  0.1749 0.4759 0.3389 0.1732 0.1691 0.3935 0.2507 
Standard  error  0.0069  0.0069 0.0753 0.0786 0.0071 0.0071 0.0782 0.0781 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 45031  45031 45031 45031 44280  4428  44280 44280 
R-squared  0.0770  0.1197 0.0452 0.0951 0.1153 0.1519 0.0916 0.1303 
Consultations on illness                    
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.1893  0.1762 0.5477 0.6609 0.1838 0.1739 0.6243 0.6551 
Standard  error  0.0194  0.0188 0.2857 0.2658 0.0196 0.0196 0.2760 0.2566 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.0933  0.0971       0.0928  0.0991 
Standard error       0.0266  0.0267       0.0258  0.0251 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations  4602  4602 4602 4602 4543 4543 4543 4543 
R-squared  0.0580  0.1373 0.0241 0.1123 0.1178 0.1808 0.0901 0.1590 
Hospitalization                     
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.0144  0.0173 -0.1137 -0.1004 0.0120 0.0157 -0.1090 -0.1068 
Standard  error  0.0032  0.0034 0.0360 0.0392 0.0034 0.0035 0.0388 0.0407 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
 Control by regions   No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 45031  45031 45031 45031 44280 44280 44280 44280 
R-squared  0.0167  0.0258 0.0163 0.0250 0.0272 0.0351 0.0270 0.0345 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
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Table 8. Effect of SR on well-being indicators (whole sample) 
Dependent variables: consumption per capita, conditions in the home are good and living standards improved lately 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS  IV OLS IV 
   Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Consumption per capita                 
Beneficiary  of  SR  -8732  -9631 -40272  -43506 -6097  -6525 -12028  -16545 
Standard  error  1252 1360  27817 26519  2443  2628  27820 23401 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 45031  45031 45031 45031 44280 44280 44280 44280 
R-squared  0.3843  0.3965 0.3835 0.3956 0.4219 0.4340 0.4215 0.4336 
Conditions in the home  
are good               
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0089  -0.0167 -0.0090 0.0959 -0.0127 -0.0164 -0.0121 -0.0181 
Standard  error  0.0068  0.0068 0.0732 0.0769 0.0067 0.0067 0.0740 0.0749 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
 Control by regions   No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 45031  45031 45031 45031 44280 44280 44280 44280 
R-squared  0.0532  0.0932 0.0531 0.0930 0.1077 0.1381 0.1076 0.1378 
Living standards  
improved lately               
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.0043  0.0112 -0.3595 -0.3309 -0.0012 0.0060 -0.3534 -0.3573 
Standard  error  0.0065  0.0064 0.0719 0.0758 0.0067 0.0066 0.0762 0.0763 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1276  0.1209       0.1218  0.1198 
Standard error       0.0090  0.0088       0.0086  0.0085 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 45031  45031 45031 45031 44280 44280 44280 44280 
R-squared  0.0241  0.0593 0.0252 0.0600 0.0495 0.0845 0.0504 0.0854 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
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Table 9. Effect of SR on employment indicators (whole sample) 
Dependent variables: labor force participation 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS  IV OLS IV 
    Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
               
Labor Participation               
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0262  -0.0292 -0.2780 -0.2342 -0.0384 -0.0394 -0.2510 -0.2419 
Standard error  0.0071  0.0071  0.0752 0.0789 0.0071 0.0072 0.0752 0.0771 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1271  0.1205       0.1251  0.1214 
Standard error       0.0106  0.0105       0.0101  0.0100 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects  No  Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations 32866  32866 32866 32866 32318 32318 32318 32318 
R-squared 0.2557  0.2683  0.2557  0.2680 0.2984 0.3074 0.2976 0.3065 
               
Male labor participation               
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0406  -0.0417 -0.1088 -0.0313 -0.0457 -0.0473 -0.1374 -0.0992 
Standard error  0.0082  0.0082  0.0851 0.0851 0.0083 0.0082 0.0844 0.0818 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1225  0.1226       0.1190  0.1225 
Standard error       0.0152  0.0154       0.0147  0.0147 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects  No  Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations 15738  15738 15738 15738 15456 15456 15456 15456 
R-squared 0.3096  0.3264  0.3076  0.3243 0.3738 0.3854 0.3715 0.3830 
               
Female labor  
participation                 
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0079  -0.0109 -0.4036 -0.3861 -0.0254 -0.0261 -0.3338 -0.3393 
Standard error  0.0108  0.0109  0.1138 0.1226 0.0107 0.0108 0.1111 0.1167 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1326  0.1219       0.1317  0.1244 
Standard error       0.0148  0.0144       0.0140  0.0137 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects  No  Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations 17128  17128 17128 17128 16862 16862 16862 16862 
R-squared 0.1647  0.1893  0.1660  0.1902 0.2143 0.2330 0.2147 0.2332 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.    54
 
Table 10. Effect of SR on the health state (SISBEN 1 and 2) 
Dependent variables: good health and days that individual was not able to perform regular activities. 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
    Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Good Health              
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0209 -0.0321 0.2860  0.2724 -0.0129 -0.0243 0.4041  0.4027 
Standard  error  0.0092 0.0092 0.0732 0.0788 0.0099 0.0099 0.1031 0.0953 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed 
effects  No Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number  of  observations  17610 17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.1564 0.1907 0.1573 0.1907 0.1870 0.2147 0.1880 0.2155 
Days that individual was 
not able to perform 
regular activities              
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.3176 -0.8219 -2.9164 -1.6822 -0.8851 -1.2957 -9.5929 -8.8110 
Standard  error  0.6874 0.6905 5.9652 7.0520 0.6884 0.6934 8.5763 9.9700 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1515  0.1360       0.1149  0.1124 
Standard error       0.0410  0.0405       0.0379  0.0380 
 Control by regions   No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations  1713 1713 1713 1713 1700 1700 1700 1700 
R-squared  0.0395 0.0912 0.0395 0.0903 0.1030 0.1391 0.1030 0.1380 
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Table 11. Effect on SR on the use of medical services (SISBEN 1 and 2) 
Dependent variables:  Preventive consultation, consultations on illness and hospitalization. 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS  IV OLS IV 
   Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Preventive  consultation               
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.2259  0.2101 0.4114 0.4093 0.1935 0.1876 0.3865 0.3870 
Standard  error  0.0095  0.0095 0.0755 0.0814 0.0103 0.0101 0.1067 0.0980 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations  17610  17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.0857  0.1424 0.0351 0.1028 0.1418 0.1888 0.1121 0.1627 
Consultations on illness               
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.1671  0.1717 0.2734 0.4328 0.1576 0.1390 0.2794 0.3675 
Standard  error  0.0291  0.0280 0.2625 0.2996 0.0305 0.0298 0.3381 0.3582 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1515  0.1360       0.1149  0.1124 
Standard error       0.0410  0.0405       0.0379  0.0380 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations  1713  1713 1713 1713 1700 1700 1700 1700 
R-squared  0.0633  0.1738 0.0368 0.1504 0.1593 0.2614 0.1412 0.2489 
Hospitalization                
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.0134  0.0164 -0.1017 -0.0793 0.0092 0.0122 -0.1050 -0.0995 
Standard  error  0.0047  0.0049 0.0391 0.0436 0.0050 0.0051 0.0561 0.0529 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations  17610  17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.0251  0.0393 0.0251 0.0386 0.0438 0.0571 0.0439 0.0570 
 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
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Table 12. Effect of SR on well-being indicators (SISBEN 1 and 2) 
Dependent variables: consumption per capita, conditions in the home are good and living standards improved lately 
 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS  IV OLS IV 
   Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Consumption per capita                   
Beneficiary of SR  -6435  -4768  73876  -65328  -6493  -5642  -74326  -74522 
Standard  error  1243 1158  11222 12134  1334  1275  15184 14281 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 17610  17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.1783  0.2750 0.1809 0.2768 0.2385 0.3172 0.2389 0.3183 
Conditions in the home  
are good               
Beneficiary  of  SR  0.0159  0.0286 0.2138 0.3988 0.0196 0.0231 0.3556 0.3743 
Standard  error  0.0091  0.0091 0.0710 0.0770 0.0098 0.0096 0.1017 0.0938 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 17610  17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.0245  0.0947 0.0250 0.0961 0.0711 0.1408 0.0718 0.1417 
Living standards  
improved lately               
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0046  0.0231 -0.3800 -0.3652 0.0109 0.0198 -0.5023 -0.4693 
Standard  error  0.0093  0.0088 0.0762 0.0815 0.0098 0.0093 0.1072 0.0964 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1808  0.1672       0.1278  0.1388 
Standard error       0.0141  0.0139       0.0128  0.0128 
 Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 17610  17610 17610 17610 17381 17381 17381 17381 
R-squared  0.0205  0.1002 0.0230 0.1015 0.0713 0.1419 0.0733 0.1435 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
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Table 13.  Effect of SR on employment indicators (SISBEN 1 y 2) 
Dependent variables: labor participation 
   National sample   National sample with additional controls 
  OLS IV  OLS  IV 
    Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
                
Labor Participation                 
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0382  -0.0357 -0.1661 -0.0774 -0.0685 -0.0679 -0.3033  -0.2572 
Standard error  0.0105  0.0104  0.0904 0.0952 0.0114 0.0113 0.1185  0.1093 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1694  0.1619       0.1279  0.1389 
Standard error       0.0175  0.0174       0.0157  0.0158 
Municipalities fixed effects  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes 
Number  of  observations 11607  11607 11607 11607 11468 11468 11468  11468 
R-squared 0.2984  0.3181  0.2973  0.3170 0.3400 0.3534 0.3371  0.3506 
                
Male labor participation                 
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0406  -0.0417 -0.1088 -0.0313 -0.0567 -0.0516 -0.0796  -0.0155 
Standard error  0.0082  0.0082  0.0851 0.0851 0.0140 0.0137 0.1434  0.1272 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1225  0.1226       0.1167  0.1288 
Standard error       0.0152  0.0154       0.0225  0.0224 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects  No  Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number of observations  15738  15738  15738  15738  5521  5521  5521  5521 
R-squared 0.3096  0.3264  0.3076  0.3243 0.3937 0.4139 0.3904  0.4113 
                
Female labor  
participation                
Beneficiary  of  SR  -0.0079  -0.0109 -0.4036 -0.3861 -0.0675 -0.0731 -0.4382  -0.4146 
Standard error  0.0108  0.0109  0.1138 0.1226 0.0164 0.0165 0.1584  0.1527 
Instrument (1 stage)       0.1326  0.1219       0.1434  0.1518 
Standard error       0.0148  0.0144       0.0219  0.0222 
  Municipalities  fixed  effects  No  Yes No    Yes No Yes No    Yes 
Number of observations  17128  17128  17128  17128  5947  5947  5947  5947 
R-squared 0.1647  0.1893  0.1660  0.1902 0.2325 0.2603 0.2307  0.2580 
Additional controls include census tracts characteristics.  
 
 